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Donor agenda-setting, bureaucratic 
advocacy and cash transfers in Uganda 
(2002-2013) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on donors and—in particular—bureaucrats as agents of 
change in welfare policy reform processes in Uganda between 2002 and 2013. It 
shows how donors managed to establish cash transfers on the development 
policy agenda (but failed to gain sufficient political support for implementation), 
and ‘recruit’ a group of supportive social development bureaucrats in the 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Protection after 2002. From 2006, 
domestic political support increased markedly, in no small part owing to both 
continued donor support and bureaucratic advocacy. Bureaucrats increasingly 
became the frontline advocates of policy reform—acting both as the agents of a 
donor agenda and, increasingly, an autonomous constituency strongly 
supportive of cash transfers within the Ugandan state. This bureaucratic ‘buy-
in’ was an essential contributor to the increasing prominence of cash transfers 
in policy debates and in securing political support for the eventual 
implementation of a cash transfer pilot scheme from 2010. These bureaucrats 
actively lobbied other sections of the bureaucracy and members of the political 
elite. The paper contends that they—with donor support—succeeded in 
constructing a coalition in support of cash transfers, comprising sections of the 
bureaucracy (including some finance and planning technocrats), civil society 
organisations and political leaders in both the legislature and executive. This 
coalition enjoyed sufficient influence to secure the approval and successful 
implementation of a cash transfer pilot, as well as to firmly establish a national 
tax-funded social pension on the domestic political agenda by 2013. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the role of donors and bureaucrats as agents of change in 
welfare policy reform processes in Uganda since 2002. While some attention 
had been paid to ‘social safety nets’ in national development planning during the 
1990s, cash transfers only truly entered the policy agenda after 2002. From the 
early 2000s, donors—principally DFID—actively promoted cash transfers and 
increasingly focused on securing political support, but faced stiff resistance from 
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conservative financial technocrats and a sceptical political elite. One important 
mechanism employed to promote cash transfers was to ‘recruit’ supportive 
social development bureaucrats as advocates of social protection policy reform 
within the Ugandan bureaucracy and political elite. This paper contends that the 
role of these bureaucrats was critical in overcoming resistance to ‘hand-outs’ 
and concerns that social protection programmes would be unaffordable and 
unsustainable.  
 
From 2006, cash transfers were increasingly seen as an essential part of 
Uganda’s development agenda, and by 2010, political support appeared to have 
increased very significantly (to the point where senior politicians were 
expressing support and social protection received substantial attention in the 
2010 National Development Plan). Civil society organisations also vigorously 
promoted increased social protection between 2002 and 2010 (and beyond). In 
2010, implementation of a donor-funded cash pilot scheme transfer started, and 
by late 2013, national rollout of a social pension was being seriously debated. 
This year may therefore constitute a turning point in that it may be the point at 
which sufficient political support for the implementation of a domestically-
funded large-scale cash transfer was reached. This is addressed in the postscript 
to this paper. While some general studies on welfare policy-making in Uganda 
have been published (e.g. Hickey, 2003; Grant, 2006; Hickey et al., 2009; 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010), these have tended to focus on donors as 
agents of policy reform and the role of bureaucrats have been neglected. This 
paper addresses this gap in the literature by showing how donors and a portion 
of the Ugandan bureaucracy have acted in concert to promote reform, with 
substantial success. 
 
Despite a generally pro-poor approach to development (reflected in investments 
in human capital development), the prevailing paradigm within the Ugandan 
state emphasised economic growth and productive activities and there existed 
strong resistance to cash transfers, especially from financial technocrats and the 
political elite. This was especially the case especially prior to 2006, but 
resistance continued up to and including 2013. From 2006, social development 
bureaucrats became increasingly strong advocates of cash transfers and social 
protection more broadly—and were more successful at securing support than 
donors had been between 2002 and 2006. An initial cash transfer pilot proposal 
(supported by donors and then-weak bureaucrats in the relevant department, the 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development) was blocked by the 
Minister of Finance in 2007. It took nearly a decade from the beginning of the 
first serious donor agenda-setting exercises—starting in 2002—before the social 
protection agenda started to be translated into real policy commitments and a 
cash transfer pilot scheme (known as the Social Assistance Grants for 
Empowerment or SAGE) was initiated in 2010. 
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As noted above, this paper’s central contention is that domestic bureaucratic 
‘buy-in’ was an essential contributor to the increasing centrality of cash transfers 
in the Ugandan development agenda and in securing political support for the 
eventual implementation of a substantial cash transfer pilot scheme. The 
approval and relatively successful implementation of the SAGE pilot from 2010, 
and the fact that a national tax-funded non-contributory pension was firmly on 
the political agenda by 2013, reflected not only donor influence (donors were 
notably unsuccessful up to 2006), but also the success of social development 
bureaucrats in constructing a supportive coalition comprising sections of the 
bureaucracy (including some finance and planning technocrats), civil society 
organisations and political leaders in the legislature and executive. However, 
given the centralised, authoritarian and personalised character of the 
Museveni/NRM regime, the support of the President and his inner circle 
remained an unknown with significant implications for political commitment to 
cash transfers.1 Despite the slow take-up of cash transfers in Uganda, and 
substantial resistance encountered, the Ugandan case nevertheless stands in stark 
contrast to certain other African countries where donors (most prominently 
DFID) promoted similar schemes, e.g. Zambia, where domestic political actors 
never ‘bought into’ major reform (see Kabandula and Seekings, forthcoming).2 
 
To clarify the periodisation: Three important periods in welfare policy reform 
can be identified, dominated by different actors: (1) failed donor agenda-setting 
on cash transfers prior to 2002 (see Grebe and Mubiru, 2014); (2) more astute 
donor agenda-setting of cash transfers with (weak) bureaucratic support and 
technocratic resistance (2002-2006); and (3) successful donor and bureaucratic 
                                           
1 It is important to note the dominance of the policy arena by a small and relatively insular 
elite—with Museveni himself at the pinnacle—in what Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013) 
characterise as a ‘dominant leader form of political settlement’. Museveni has governed in a 
highly personalised style (Mwenda, 2007; Tripp, 2010), and the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) has dominated the legislature even after the re-introduction of multiparty 
elections in 2006. 
2 This paper forms part of a series on the politics of social protection in Uganda. While the 
focus here is on the role of donors and bureaucrats in the politics of planning, building 
political support for, financing, implementing and scaling up cash transfer programmes, the 
broader evolution of Ugandan development policy under the Museveni/NRM regime, the 
‘pre-history’ of cash transfers and the linkages between the ‘poverty eradication era’ of the 
1990s and the increase in prominence of social protection (in general) and cash transfers (in 
particular) are reviewed in greater detail in Grebe and Mubiru (2014). This paper therefore 
focuses largely on the post-2002 period and should ideally be read with the history and 
broader context sketched out in the related paper referred to above. Both these papers on 
Uganda form part of a broader research project on the politics of welfare policy reform in 
Africa, and it is anticipated that in later phases of the research a more comparative focus will 
be adopted. Important questions like how and why Uganda differed or were similar to other 
African countries, like Kenya and Zambia, reforming their welfare regimes are therefore not 
addressed in any detail at this stage. This is however, and important area of on-going research. 
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advocacy on cash transfers culminating in implementation of a cash transfer 
pilot (2006-2013) and consideration of a national social pension from 2013 
onwards. Bureaucrats became unequivocally central to advocacy efforts from 
2010 onwards. The second two periods are covered in detail in this paper. It is 
possible that a fourth period—one of national scale-up—was on the horizon, and 
late 2013/early 2014 appeared to be a crucial moment, but at the time of writing3 
this can only be speculated about (see postscript). 
 
By early 2014, the donor-funded SAGE cash transfer pilot scheme, which forms 
part of the broader Expanding Social Protection (ESP) programme, remained the 
only significant cash transfers scheme in Uganda. In 2010, the Government of 
Uganda began to implement the SAGE cash transfer pilot in fourteen districts 
(with a fifteenth added in 2013).4 It comprised a social pension available to all 
persons of 65 years and older (except in the relatively poorer Karamoja region, 
where the age of eligibility was 60) and a poverty-targeted grant aimed at the 
most vulnerable 15% of families in each pilot district. Both SAGE and the 
broader ESP were largely donor-funded—primarily by the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) and the Irish bilateral aid 
agency IrishAid, with technical assistance from UNICEF—but were being 
implemented by the Ugandan government through a dedicated secretariat in the 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD). This new 
Social Protection Secretariat was well-capacitated—especially compared to the 
historically weak MGLSD—and received substantial technical and financial 
assistance from donors, including in the form of embedded staff with key roles 
(deployed by an agency contracted to donors). 
 
That the pilot formed part of a broader policy-development and social protection 
promotion programme (the ESP, which had as its core goal the ‘embedding of a 
national social protection system’) reflected (1) the hostile political environment 
donors initially encountered and (2) a realisation that domestic politics was the 
key determinant of success (see Hickey et al., 2009). Substantial resistance 
(from a sceptical political elite and fiscally conservative technocrats) to social 
assistance, and cash transfers in particular, had to be overcome. This is why 
agenda-setting and political support-building by donors and social development 
bureaucrats were so central to welfare policy reform in Uganda. More detail on 
the general political environment and the evolution of the prevailing 
                                           
3 Fieldwork (largely consisting of key informant interviews) for this research was conducted 
during early 2014 and the paper was being finalised in late 2014. Further fieldwork is 
envisaged, both with a view to addressing other aspects of the politics of social protection in 
Uganda and to address areas where insufficient data is available for optimal analysis at this 
stage. 
4 The first payments to beneficiaries were only made in 2011, so 2011 is sometimes referred 
to as the year in which the SAGE pilot was initiated. 
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developmental paradigm in Uganda since 1986 can be found in Grebe and 
Mubiru (2014). 
 
 
1.1 Outline 
 
The rest of this introduction provides a very brief background to the slow 
appearance of cash transfers on the development agenda in Uganda. The paper 
then turns to the early agenda-setting efforts of donors, including through the 
establishment of a donor-supported Social Protection Task Force in the MGLSD 
and the failure of an SPTF-proposed cash transfer pilot5 to attain Finance 
Ministry approval (2002-2006). By 2006, cash transfers featured more 
prominently on the policy agenda, but this did not translate into sufficient 
political support for programme implementation to be initiated. Donors and 
supportive bureaucrats intensified their agenda-setting and advocacy efforts, 
culminating in the acceptance of the ESP/SAGE proposal in 2010. After 2010, 
bureaucrats played an increasingly important role in the promotion of social 
protection and cash transfers, including through donor-funded investment in and 
support for a ‘civil society platform’ and ‘parliamentary forum’ on social 
protection, as well as substantial intra-governmental lobbying by social 
development bureaucrats (primarily those in the MGLSD and the newly-created 
Social Protection Secretariat it housed). Part of this process was the generation 
of evidence on the impacts of cash transfers through the SAGE pilot, which was 
coupled with an explicit data collection, operational and impact research, 
evidence dissemination, as well as awareness and support-building strategy. It 
concludes that the activities of both donors and social development bureaucrats 
were crucial in securing sufficient political support for a cash transfer to be 
launched and implemented successfully—and that these activities in turn were 
predicated upon the recognition that welfare policy reform depended on politics 
and not simply on formal policy-making or the availability of resources. 
 
In a postscript, the paper (somewhat tentatively) addresses the more recent 
political debates around national scale-up of a social pension, in which social 
development bureaucrats continued to play a central role and finance and 
planning technocrats became increasingly involved in planning for a proposed 
national rollout of social pensions. However, the commitment of the President 
and other high-level political leaders to the scale-up proposal remained unclear 
in early 2014. As noted above, late 2013/early 2014 may turn out to be a critical 
                                           
5 In the light of DFID’s strong influence in the SPTF (see Grant, 2006), and the fact that the 
pilot would have been fully donor-funded, this proposed cash transfer pilot may perhaps be 
better described as a donor proposal. 
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turning point at which cash transfers truly attained sufficient momentum to 
support sustainable resourcing and implementation from domestic resources. 
 
 
1.2. Background: development policy in Uganda 
prior to cash transfers gaining in prominence (1986-
2002) 
 
Uganda is a low-income country (GNI per capita US$ 4806), but made 
significant developmental strides during the 1990s and 2000s. In particular it 
sustained relatively high levels of economic growth7 and the proportion of the 
population living in poverty halved between 1992 and 2010, although inequality 
increased.8 The Museveni government gained a reputation for good governance, 
low levels of corruption and good management of the economy, consequently 
attracting high levels of foreign aid. Its policies have been widely described as 
pro-poor (Melo et al., 2012; Mosley, 2012). It invested substantial resources in 
social services like health and education (Hickey, 2012), introducing universal 
primary education in 1997 (Nishimura et al., 2008) and abolishing user fees for 
health in 2001, with a marked increase in utilisation (Nambyonga et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately, increased public expenditure did not necessarily result in 
commensurate improvements in service delivery (Reinikka, 2001), the quality of 
education may have declined as enrolments increased (Deininger, 2003; 
Robichaud et al., 2014), education budgets stagnated in recent years (Robichaud 
et al., 2014) and out-of-pocket expenditures on health remained high (Orem et 
al., 2011). 
 
Despite investment in human capital development, welfare policy had been 
limited in scope and social protection largely limited to social security for 
formal sector employees (public sector pensions and the National Social 
Security Fund for private sector employees). For most of the post-colonial 
period, Uganda’s developmental trajectory was largely a continuation of the 
approach of late colonial British policy, described by Seekings (2013) as 
‘developing’ African economies through ‘rather ineffective “developmental 
                                           
6 GNI per capita (Atlas method) for 2012 in current US dollars (World Bank, 2014). 
7 Average annual real GDP growth was 6.9% in 1990-1999 and 7.2% in 2000-2009 (growth 
rates have since declined.) This compares to 2.1% and 5.1%, respectively, for all low-income 
countries over the same periods (World Bank, 2014).  
8 The proportion of the population living beneath the poverty line was 56% in 1992/93 and 
25% in 2009/2010. This represents an absolute decline of the population in poverty from 10 
million to 7.5 million. The proportion of the population classified as non-poor but insecure 
had, however, increased from 33% to 43% over the same period and the Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.37 to 0.43 (MFPED, 2012: ix). 
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states” focused primarily on agricultural development’. In the first decades after 
Ugandan independence, development policy continued to focus on agricultural 
development in the countryside (Mamdani, 1976), with what Ferguson (2012) 
calls ‘strategies of restoring and developing peasant agriculture [that] were 
tightly bound up with fantasies of a communal and caring rural society that had 
to be restored’. Care for and assistance to the poor therefore continued to be 
seen as the responsibility of kin and community, best supported by improving 
rural livelihoods. In contrast to Southern African British colonies (especially the 
‘settler colonies’) no ‘poor law’ tradition exists in Uganda, and the relatively 
fertile soil and predictable rainfall made food aid and input subsidies on the 
scale of those provided in countries like Malawi largely unnecessary. Food 
security was mostly a problem confined to the conflict-ridden and climatically 
more vulnerable North. 
 
Public assistance to the vulnerable had been restricted to agricultural advisory 
services, district-level social development services, and a small number of 
‘social safety nets’ in the form of school feeding schemes, a district-
administered disability grant,9 etc. World Bank and European Union 
reconstruction and recovery programmes in Northern Uganda, implemented 
from the early 2000s, included some social protection elements (public works, 
‘cash for work’ youth schemes and Village Savings and Loans Associations), 
but were mainly targeted at the economically active and aimed at stimulating 
productive activity. These programmes nevertheless were significant, with large 
sums expended in the World Bank-financed Northern Uganda Social Action 
Fund (NUSAF)10 and EU-funded Northern Uganda Agricultural Livelihoods 
Recovery Programme. These interventions aimed at Northern Uganda—forming 
part of a broader Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (OPM, 2010)—
were implemented in the aftermath of decades of disruption caused by conflict, 
collapsing state infrastructure and were in part occasioned by the more 
precarious nature of agricultural livelihoods in this region. In their analysis of 
NUSAF, Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010), make clear the ‘exceptional’ 
nature of the development efforts in Northern Uganda: 
 
‘Despite Uganda’s success at ‘mainstreaming the poverty agenda’ in 
national policy processes via the PEAP and its relatively extensive 
system of decentralised governance, NUSAF was not integrated into 
either, with line ministries and government both rejected as the main 
channel for the project…’ (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010: 1225). 
 
                                           
9 This grant is not a cash grant available to individual persons with disabilities, but is rather 
aimed at organised groups for self-help and income-generating activities, etc. 
10 The first NUSAF, known as NUSAF I (funded to the tune of $133m) ran from 2003 to 2009 
and NUSAF II, with a budget of $100m started in late 2010. 
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This indicates that the Northern Uganda programmes were generally seen (and 
treated) as exceptional, existing outside broader social protection policy, and did 
not serve as de facto pilots for social protection programmes in the rest of the 
country, or to have seen much (if any) involvement from the social development 
bureaucrats that feature centrally in this paper. 
 
A recognition of the state as a primary agent in ensuring social safety nets, 
beyond supporting the ‘development’ of peasant and commercial agriculture, 
has only emerged after 2002. For most of the period since Museveni and his 
National Resistance Army11 took power in 1986, Uganda pursued a market-
friendly and growth-oriented development policy. The mid-1990s to the 
early/mid-2000s is often referred to as ‘the poverty eradication era’, when 
poverty featured centrally in development thinking. During this period the 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of 1997 (MFPED, 1997) signalled a 
significant shift that placed poverty reduction at the core of Ugandan 
development policy (Mugambe, 2011), but social assistance and ‘social safety 
nets’ remained very marginal as potential anti-poverty measures. From the mid-
2000s the poverty agenda was increasingly displaced by a renewed emphasis on 
‘growth and prosperity’ (Hickey, 2012), but social protection and cash transfers 
also appeared on the agenda, as described below. 
 
 
2. Social protection appears on the policy 
agenda through donor agenda-setting (2002-
2006) 
 
The notion of ‘social safety nets’ received regular mention in development 
planning documents, but remained at the margins of development policy  
throughout the ‘poverty eradication era’ of the mid-1990s to the early/mid-
2000s. Social protection in a more defined and substantial sense only appeared 
on the policy agenda from the early 2000s onwards, largely through the efforts 
of DFID, a number of civil society organisations, and a small group of social 
development bureaucrats. During this period donors were unambiguously the 
primary proponents of and agenda-setters on cash transfers, but they invested 
heavily in securing domestic political ‘buy-in’ and ‘recruiting’ supportive 
bureaucrats in their efforts to secure cash transfers on the Ugandan development 
policy agenda. 
                                           
11 The National Resistance Army (NRA) would soon after become the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), which ruled under a form of ‘no party democracy’ until competitive 
Presidential elections were introduced in 1996 and multiparty legislative elections in 2006. It 
remains the majority party in Parliament and Museveni remains President. 
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The second PEAP revision of 2004—PEAP III (MFPED 2004), which was 
produced after some donors and social development bureaucrats had started 
actively promoting social protection (see below), made some mention of non-
contributory social assistance targeted at the poor and vulnerable. However, it 
remained couched in ‘social safety nets’ language and the proposed programmes 
were restricted in scope and for the most part were not envisaged to take the 
form of cash transfers. Few became policy priorities or were funded in 
subsequent national budgets (Hickey et al., 2009: 63-64). 
 
In 2002, two major developments helped establish social protection on the 
policy agenda, although it would be years before this translated into tangible 
policy commitments and nearly a decade before a cash transfer pilot was finally 
launched.  
 
The first development was the creation of a Social Protection Task Force 
(SPTF). The SPTF was housed in the MGLSD and included social development 
bureaucrats, as well as officials from the MFPED, other Ministries, the Office of 
the Prime Minister, and representatives from NGOs and donors (Grant, 2006; 
ESP, 2013). It appears to have received substantial technical support from 
DFID, although the exact nature of this support is not clear.12  
 
Around the same time, the first NUSAF programme was agreed upon and 
launched. Elements of social protection were finding their way into 
reconstruction and development projects in Northern Uganda, apparently in 
large part owing to the initiative of the World Bank, as described earlier. These 
did not include cash transfers. As indicated earlier, however, it operated 
separately from broader Ugandan development initiatives and appears to have 
been conceived primarily as a response to the very specific challenges of post-
conflict conditions in the North. It was also a World Bank-financed programme 
and MGLSD bureaucrats had little to no operational involvement (see earlier 
discussion). 
 
The SPTF’s activities (such as commissioned research and consultative 
meetings) were funded and supported by DFID and can be seen as the start of a 
deliberate and extensive agenda-setting exercise.13 In a report for DFID the 
SPTF is described as a major component of the first stage of DFID’s efforts to 
promote social protection in Uganda, which was focused on ‘establishing SP as 
                                           
12 Unfortunately, a full history of the SPTF is not available in the published literature and 
extensive data on this important development was not collected during the fieldwork for this 
research. This is an area in which further research is required. 
13 Again, the exact details of DFID’s support to and involvement in the SPTF process are not 
available at this time, but has been identified as an area for further research. 
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a policy agenda’ (Hickey et al., 2009: 19). Furthermore, the SPTF was described 
as having been ‘designed to act as the champion of SP within [the Government 
of Uganda], initially by securing a policy focus on SP within the third Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan’. The task force’s first major output was a report 
identifying a wide range of ‘micro-initiatives’ in existence, but noted that these 
operated in a policy vacuum and demand for social protection vastly outstripped 
supply. It recommended a strengthened regulatory framework and a range of 
interventions from tax-financed minimum income guarantees to the expansion 
of contributory social security (Devereux et al., 2002).14 At the same time, civil 
society voices were starting to call for an increased focus on social protection in 
development and poverty reduction. The first Chronic Poverty Report (CPRC 
Uganda, 2005) represented one of the earliest efforts by civil society to promote 
social protection as a core element of the development agenda, arguing that 
evidence from other low-income countries suggested that social protection 
measures were both desirable and affordable.  
 
The second important development of 2002 was the production of the first 
official government document to extensively treat social protection as a policy 
response to extreme and chronic poverty, the Social Development Sector 
Strategic Investment Plan (SDIP). Even the SDIP largely reflected the prevailing 
emphasis on livelihoods and improved income-generating opportunities for the 
poor, but also called for a ‘strengthened institutional and regulatory framework 
for social protection’ (MGLSD, 2003: 10). It further envisaged specific support 
and ‘safety nets’ aimed at ‘people in difficult circumstances’, including such 
vulnerable groups as orphans, child labourers, people with disabilities, those 
affected by HIV and the elderly (MGLSD, 2003: 14). These early efforts by 
donors and social development bureaucrats to embed social protection in the 
development policy agenda had some success, but faced substantial resistance, 
especially from technocrats in the MFPED, who had overall responsibility for 
policy development and planning processes. In summary: social protection 
appeared on the policy agenda, but did not become a policy priority for the 
Government of Uganda as a whole. 
 
Grant’s (2006: 7-10) analysis of the effectiveness and influence of the SPTF 
process (the most extensive documentation of this process available) is based on 
interviews with members of the task force from all the represented sectors, as 
well as interested observers within the Ugandan government. At the time the 
process was perceived as having ‘fallen flat’, with momentum having been lost 
and the SDIP failing to be operationalised. She identifies a number of 
                                           
14 Two of the lead researchers were from the University of Sussex’s Institute for Development 
Studies and the third from the Kampala-based research NGO Development Research and 
Training. 
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deficiencies in the process. Attempts to influence sectors during the PEAP 
revision of 2003-4 largely failed and sectors did not ‘really engage with the 
concept or ideas presented through the SPTF’ (2006: 8). Very little direction 
was provided by the MGLSD as lead ministry, compounded by the Ministry’s 
‘lack of clout’ as a result of its reputation as weak and ineffective (2006: 9). 
Furthermore, two major donors were perceived as being at odds with one 
another with DFID’s ‘vulnerability and poverty framework’ and the World 
Bank’s ‘social risk management (SRM) framework’ seen as competing and 
incompatible agendas—some of Grant’s MGLSD informants even suggested 
that the World Bank had been dismissive of ideas developed by DFID (Grant, 
2006: 8). She appears to consider the key failures a ‘lack of leadership’ and 
‘insufficient efforts’ to further the social protection agenda within the Ugandan 
government: 
 
‘One informant in the Ministry of Finance observed that the 
presentation of what was actually needed wasn’t thoroughly or 
convincingly detailed—or perhaps more importantly, argued. Despite 
having the commissioned support studies, the MGLSD did not push 
the issues forward aggressively. …without clear leadership within the 
Ministry of Gender, social protection issues simply didn’t make an 
impact. He acknowledges that there were some very good ideas … but 
they simply [had] not been picked up. Similarly, the … [MGLSD 
officials] expected that once information on social protection had been 
collected, analysed and documented, uptake and buy-in by the 
different relevant institutions would be automatic’ (Grant, 2006: 9). 
 
It is difficult to judge how important ‘failures’ in these early agenda-setting and 
promotion efforts of donors and bureaucrats were relative to a lack of 
receptiveness among sceptical technocrats and politicians. Paul Onapa, at the 
time of fieldwork for this research a senior manager at Development Research 
and Training (DRT)15—a research agency with a focus on chronic poverty since 
its founding in 1997 and very active in promoting social protection in Uganda—
described the appetite for social assistance and cash transfers during this period 
as extremely limited, and attributed this to the prevalence of fears that it would 
‘breed dependency’ on the state, near-unanimity among financial technocrats 
that it would be unaffordable and unsustainable, as well as its divergence from a 
firmly entrenched conception of the state’s developmental role as one of 
creating an ‘enabling environment’ rather than addressing poverty and 
                                           
15 Onapa had about a decade of experience in poverty-focused civil society organisations, a 
significant portion of which he spent at DRT where he had primary responsibility for social 
protection-related research and advocacy work—also forming part of the team that designed 
the first proposed cash transfer pilot (see below). In 2014 he accepted a position with the 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. 
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vulnerability through direct assistance.16 In light of this, along with donors 
providing mixed signals and the perceived divergence between DFID and the 
World Bank—a ‘joint assistance strategy’ from Uganda’s major donors (ADB et 
al., 2005) made no mention of social protection—it is not surprising that the 
champions of social protection met with limited success. 
 
Since social development bureaucrats played an important part in the SPTF and 
were responsible for the production of SDIP, the role of bureaucrats clearly 
started to become important even in this donor-dominated period. It would be 
inaccurate to characterise the agenda-setting efforts of DFID, supportive social 
development bureaucrats, and to some extent civil society during this period as 
entirely unsuccessful. As the references to safety nets in PEAP III demonstrate, 
social assistance had penetrated the policy discourse and were to some extent 
‘on the agenda’, even if this did not translate into significant policy reforms. In 
addition, the Ugandan government became party to the Livingstone Call for 
Action, a declaration issued at an African Union conference in Zambia in 2006, 
which called on African states to produce comprehensive social protection 
plans. 
 
But despite social assistance appearing on the policy agenda, no real policy 
reform occurred for several years and social development bureaucrats 
championing expanded social protection made limited headway. No 
comprehensive national social protection plan was developed in line with the 
Livingstone Call for Action. This seems unsurprising given that the then-
Minister of Gender, Labour and Social Development, Zoe Bakoko Bakoru, had 
reportedly argued at the conference that “the ever-present fear of the cost of 
social protection programmes makes them unattractive” (HelpAge International, 
2006: 19).17  
 
The limited progress made by proponents was evident in the fact that 
programmes either did not progress beyond the design stage or were simply not 
awarded the necessary budgetary appropriations. Development plans and policy 
documents from the ‘poverty eradication era’ reveal the continued dominance of 
a livelihoods-oriented development paradigm which emphasised helping the 
poor become self-sufficient and productive, rather than directly supporting 
income and consumption. It is only in the more recent overarching development 
                                           
16 Interview, Paul Onapa (20 January 2014). 
17
 Notably, at the time of this research few informants referred to the Livingstone Call for 
Action in interviews, except the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Forum, who cited it as one 
among a set of international obligations that underscored her optimism about the future of 
social protection in Uganda (Interview, Flavia Kabahenda, MP, 4 February 2014). It certainly 
did not appear to be perceived as a very significant moment in the history of welfare and 
social policy reform in Uganda. 
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policy documents, the National Development Plan (GoU, 2010) and Vision 2040 
(GoU, 2013)—published after the major programmatic commitment of 
ESP/SAGE had been approved—that social protection was identified as a major 
policy priority. 
 
As far as can be determined from the available data, this period was one 
essentially of donor agenda-setting, with enthusiastic but relatively low-level 
bureaucratic involvement. Despite the SPTF’s nominal inter-ministerial 
character and Permanent-Secretary-level representation on the task force, most 
significant work appears to have been done by lower-level bureaucrats and 
outside consultants. Donors (especially DFID) were the major source of ideas 
and policy proposals. Ideas and language related to social protection found their 
way into major policy documents, but seem to have largely been the product of 
compromises reached in consultative document-production processes, rather 
than significant penetration of institutions like the MFPED and the Presidency 
by the emerging social protection agenda. Supportive bureaucrats remained 
largely confined to the MGLSD—at the time widely perceived as weak, lacking 
in influence, and not one of the ‘core development’ Ministries. 18 
 
 
3. Towards policy reform: programmatic 
proposals and continued promotion of cash 
transfers with bureaucratic support (2006-2010) 
 
During this period, donors remained the primary driving force of policy reform 
and primary proponents of cash transfers, but had already secured substantial 
bureaucratic ‘buy-in’ and supportive bureaucrats increasingly became the 
principal agents pursuing political support for cash transfers. Donors like DFID 
were also starting to think actively about the failure of their efforts to secure 
domestic political support and even commissioned studies aimed at informing 
their efforts to influence policy on social protection in Uganda and elsewhere, 
for example the study by Hickey et al. (2009). As will be shown below, 
advocacy and building political support became a central concern, and 
bureaucratic advocacy would be central to DFID’s strategy. 
 
Since a central contention of this paper is that bureaucratic advocacy was a 
crucial success factor, it is important to consider how influential the Ugandan 
bureaucracy was relative to political leaders, and social development bureaucrats 
                                           
18 The broader history of the evolution of social protection policy is addressed in Grebe and 
Mubiru (2014), and some of the specifics of bureaucratic influence in this evolution require 
further research. 
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relative to technocrats in the Presidency, Office of the Prime Minister and, 
crucially, the Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately, the literature on the Ugandan 
bureaucracy is extremely limited (and so is the data available on the specific 
bureaucratic actors during this period). Notably, there is almost nothing 
available on intra-bureaucratic policy rivalry, apart from Grant (2006), who 
showed that the MGLSD was at the time considered weak and lacking in 
influence, especially when compared to the MFPED. Some of the available 
literature (for example, Bitaliwo, 2014), suggests that while bureaucratic 
capacity had been rising in the post-colonial era, the Ugandan bureaucracy 
lacked independence and was subject to political interference. He notes, 
 
‘[This political element] … is very critical in defining the direction the 
bureaucracies can and shall take in tackling the implementation of the 
public good. It is this political element therefore that makes reform 
efforts more strategic in the direction of the policies of the government 
for the benefit of the governed’ (Bitaliwo, 2014: 47). 
 
Byaruhanga (2013: 19) further asserts that an extremely high level of control 
was exerted by the executive over both the bureaucracy and the other arms of 
government (the judiciary and legislature). If correct, these assertions would 
chime with the claim made by numerous respondents for this research that 
‘official policy’ was not the primary factor driving what happened in Ugandan 
policy implementation. Rather, politics determined outcomes, and when a policy 
was perceived as enjoying political support at the highest level, it was more 
likely to be funded and implemented than otherwise. This also appears to be 
what donors later realised when they shifted their attention increasingly to 
securing high-level political support (see later in this section). Despite these 
suggestions of political capture of the bureaucracy—which have some merit—
other researchers have suggested that high levels of public information can act 
as a powerful deterrent to the corrupt use of funds and enhance the quality of 
service delivery in Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson, 2011), a further lesson that 
donors appear to have learnt and that is reflected in their actions described in the 
next section. The evidence presented in this section suggests that despite the 
relative weakness of the MGLSD (Grant, 2006), donor support for bureaucratic 
capacity in the MGLSD allowed social development bureaucrats to become 
effective advocates for policy reform. Coupled with explicit efforts to secure 
high-level political support, progress in policy reform could be attained that had 
not been possible before. 
 
From 2006, the SPTF decided to focus on cash transfers as the primary social 
protection mechanism it sought to promote (Hickey et al., 2009). A 
Memorandum of Understanding between DFID and the Government of Uganda 
to design and pilot a cash transfer scheme was signed in late 2006. The SPTF 
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commissioned external consultants to design the pilot (with funding and support 
from DFID), with DRT as the lead partner in a design team that also included 
international consultants. It produced a comprehensive proposal, which was 
accepted and published by the SPTF in June 2007 (MGLSD, 2007). This was a 
period characterised by significant enthusiasm for pilot cash transfer schemes on 
the part of DFID. It had funded similar pilot schemes in other countries in the 
region—notably Zambia, where a cash transfer pilot was well underway, 
although that pilot increasingly faltered owing to lack of enthusiasm and even 
outright opposition from Zambian political leaders (see Kabandula and 
Seekings, forthcoming)—and DFID was presumably seeking to replicate these 
efforts in Uganda. 
 
Two of the proposed pilot’s primary aims would be to ‘demonstrate the 
desirability and feasibility of such a scheme’ and to ‘win political support’ for 
cash transfers (MGLSD, 2007: vii). The team clearly sought to base the pilot 
design on sound evidence, as shown by the series of background papers 
commissioned for it (including a vulnerability assessment, reviews of 
international literature and simulations, and models to quantify expected 
impacts). It also consulted widely with civil society and academia. The 
published design clearly showed the influence of civil society and research 
groups that were concerned with ‘chronic poverty’ at the time. The terms of 
reference called for a ‘cash transfer pilot scheme to address chronic poverty’ 
(my emphasis) and the design document extensively cited the first Chronic 
Poverty Report (CPRC Uganda, 2005)19 referred to earlier. 
 
The SPTF had donor, civil society and wide government representation, but its 
outputs were mainly driven by MGLSD bureaucrats, drawing on the expertise of 
external consultants (paid for by donors) and ideas originating with or relayed 
by donors. Despite the still primary role of donors at this stage in promoting a 
social protection agenda (in this case, specifically cash transfers), the SPTF’s 
leading role in commissioning the design of a pilot cash transfer and in seeking 
approval from the Finance Ministry can be seen as the start of bureaucratic 
coalition-building around cash transfers. This coalition-building becomes both 
more prominent and more successful at a later stage, as described in the next 
section. 
 
Despite the recognised need to win political support for cash transfers, the SPTF 
and their consultants appeared to underestimate the opposition even a pilot cash 
transfer scheme might face and the document made little effort to present cash 
transfers as anything other than a mechanism to address poverty directly. For 
                                           
19 Note that CPRC Uganda and the DRT comprised an overlapping set of people, closely 
linked with the Manchester-based Chronic Poverty Centre. 
16 
 
example, it prominently presents estimates of the impact on the poverty gap of 
various options. The design envisaged targeting beneficiaries in the lowest 
decile of consumption expenditure and proposed a transfer of UGX 18,000 per 
household (US$ 10.58 in June 2007) plus supplementary transfers of 
UGX 2,000 for every child under 18, elderly person (60 and older), and person 
living with a disability in the household up to a maximum of five supplementary 
transfers. It proposed six pilot districts selected on the basis of a multi-criterion 
ranking based on demographic characteristics (the share of vulnerable people in 
the district population). It further proposed relatively complex eligibility criteria 
for individual households and a ranking procedure for selecting from eligible 
households. The proposed scheme included ‘soft conditionalities’ in an attempt 
to establish links between the transfer and health, education and nutritional 
outcomes through ‘moral suasion’ and ‘opt-in incentives’ to meet a package of 
health and schooling commitments (MGLSD, 2007: 15-16).  
 
The soft conditionalities included in the design may very well reflect an attempt 
on the part of the donors, social development bureaucrats, and their partners to 
‘sell’ the idea of cash transfers to a political and policy elite expected to be 
sceptical of ‘hand-outs’ that require little or nothing in return from beneficiaries; 
conditionalities are widely seen as having rendered social assistance more 
palatable to the middle classes in Latin America.20 But the opposition 
encountered when the SPTF and MGLSD moved to put the pilot scheme into 
action was unexpectedly strong. The pilot faced significant resistance from 
Finance Ministry officials, which Paul Onapa of the DRT (and member of the 
original design team) attributed to ‘hard-core’ (neoliberal) economic ideology in 
the MFPED: 
 
‘This design was not taken up … because then social protection was 
just coming up… But also because this was challenging an economic 
model that existed. The technocrats [in the MFPED] believe in hard-
core [neoliberal] economics and also harbour what I call elite attitudes 
towards the poor. We could see this from statements from the 
governor of the central bank, the Minister of Finance. These are 
people [who believed] that poor people are poor because of their own 
actions, and therefore they must work harder to lift themselves out of 
poverty. They did not believe the state had a role in helping to lift the 
                                           
20 Although it should be noted that informants focused more on the ‘fashion’ for and 
international experience with conditional cash transfers than on their potential political utility 
in discussions of this issue. However, see the quote from Paul Onapa below for some 
suggestion that proponents were aware that unconditional ‘hand-outs’ may be less politically 
acceptable than conditional transfers. 
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poor out of poverty using measures that are not conditioned on [the 
poor] doing anything’ (interview, Paul Onapa, 20 January 2014).21 
 
Stephen Barrett (leader of the technical assistance team based in the Social 
Protection Secretariat created within the MGLSD to implement the ESP) also 
attributed the failure of the first pilot to its ‘poverty focus’ and negative elite 
attitudes to cash transfers: 
 
‘This is why the first programme failed: it was a poverty-targeted 
programme, it was designed to use proxy means testing and a 
conditional cash transfer programme, all around poverty. … 
[Decision-makers] didn’t see cash transfers as an answer to poverty, 
they saw hard work and economic growth and [the poor] ‘getting off 
their backsides’ as the answer to poverty’ (interview, Stephen Barrett, 
13 January 2014). 
 
The then-Minister of Finance, Dr Ezra Suruma (an economist by training), 
blocked implementation of the project by refusing to issue the legally required 
‘certificate of financial implication’, without which even donor-sourced but 
government-administered expenditure is impossible. The Minister’s apparent 
concerns were over the ‘affordability of the project over the long term and its 
donor-led character’ (Hickey et al., 2009: 65). According to Paul Onapa and 
John Bosco Mubiru (also of DRT), sustainability was indeed a serious concern.22 
Both financial technocrats and their political principals were aware that once 
implemented, even a pilot scheme would be difficult to roll back, potentially 
creating an open-ended financial commitment if donor support ended.23  
 
The SPTF and the designers of the pilot had apparently simply not anticipated 
the level of resistance the plan would encounter and too little groundwork had as 
yet been done to build awareness of and political support for it. The proponents 
of a cash transfer pilot had no choice but to go back to the drawing board, this 
time setting out on an extensive and well-planned advocacy exercise, alongside 
attempting to design a more politically acceptable pilot scheme. The social 
development bureaucrats in the MGLSD became increasingly central to the 
advocacy exercise.  
 
Proponents now saw building political support for social protection in general, 
and a cash transfer pilot in particular, as critical, says Beatrice Okillan (a long-
standing official in the MGLSD and later Policy and Learning Manager in the 
                                           
21 The reference to the poor ‘doing something in return’ probably refers more to ‘work’ than 
to conditionalities related to health, schooling, etc. in this context. 
22 Interviews, John Bosco Mubiru and Paul Onapa (20 January 2014). 
23 Interview, Stephen Barrett (13 January 2014). 
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Social Protection Secretariat administering ESP/SAGE).24 A senior DFID 
official and a DFID-contracted consultant explained that the agency now 
understood that merely offering funds for an initiative would not guarantee its 
acceptance, particularly when elite attitudes in general were not favourable to 
social protection and financial technocrats and politicians were (understandably) 
concerned over creating long-term liabilities.25 
 
This represents a critical turning point at which donors realised that domestic 
politics is a central issue to be addressed in pursuing their agenda, and that 
supportive bureaucrats ‘embedded’ in the state whose developmental priorities it 
wishes to influence were among their most important assets alongside the direct 
leverage of financial muscle. The commissioned study mentioned in the opening 
paragraph of this section in part reflected this realisation. 
 
While winning political support for cash transfers had previously been an 
intended and expected outcome of implementing a pilot, it was now seen as a 
prerequisite for even getting a pilot off the ground. This increased focus on 
building support is reflected even in the name given to the programme that was 
eventually to be implemented: the Expanding Social Protection programme, of 
which the SAGE cash transfer pilot is a mere a component, albeit arguably the 
most important and certainly the most costly. 
 
A new set of consultants, led by Maxwell Stamp Plc., was engaged (although 
retaining DRT as part of the team) to design a new pilot.26 The proposed design 
for what eventually became the ESP and SAGE differed from the previous 
proposal in several respects. It was larger (fourteen pilot districts instead of six, 
but still selected based on a vulnerability analysis) and included both a poverty-
targeted and ‘categorical’ or ‘universal’ transfer (as opposed to a pure poverty-
targeted formula) while dropping any form of conditionality.27 The programme 
was no longer merely expected to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness 
of cash transfers, but had extensive (and budgeted for) advocacy and capacity 
development components intended to build a comprehensive ‘social protection 
system’. Its aims explicitly included ‘embed[ding] a national social protection 
                                           
24 Interview, Beatrice Okillan (13 January 2014). 
25 Interviews, Stephen Barrett and Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
26 It seems somewhat paradoxical that the introduction of foreign consultants coincided with 
explicit efforts to secure domestic political support and avoid the perception of the new pilot 
being ‘donor-driven’. This paradox cannot be fully resolved using the available data, but may 
reflect a desire for a more ‘technically convincing’ design. However, there is no direct 
evidence from interviews for this hypothesis. It is a question that should be addressed in 
further research. 
27 The relative lack of interest in conditionalities in Uganda as a potential source of political 
support remains somewhat of a mystery, with informants giving contradictory and sometimes 
implausable explanations. This is another area calling for additional research. 
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system, including Direct Income Support,28 as a core element of Uganda's 
national policy, planning and budgeting processes’ (Kasaija, 2011) and to 
develop social protection capacity in the MGLSD (Bukuluki and Watson, 2012: 
13). Winning support for and embedding social protection in the Ugandan policy 
landscape would be pursued partly through the implementation of the pilot, but 
would also include active lobbying across a range of institutions and sectors of 
society and building institutional capacity within the Government of Uganda to 
implement social assistance schemes. For example, donors would fund study 
tours for officials and politicians to be exposed to the experiences of countries 
that had implemented cash transfer schemes, and funding would be allocated to 
civil society organisations advocating expanded social protection. MGLSD 
officials would lead this lobbying and advocacy exercise. 
 
In addition, the MGLSD and its donor partners now sought high-level political 
buy-in from the outset, placing its proposal before Cabinet rather than 
attempting to forge ahead with implementation subject to approval from the 
Finance Ministry. It was understood that in the context of Uganda’s personalised 
politics, gaining the support of Museveni and his inner circle was critical, and 
even several years after implementation of the pilot had started senior officials 
were continuing to actively pursue the President in an attempt to win his 
support. (Officials responsible for the ESP even attempted to woo the President 
via his wife, Janet Museveni, who was also the Minister for Karamoja.29) It was 
widely believed (and a number of informants expressed this view) that important 
political decisions are made by a very small circle of influential ‘insiders’ who 
had the ear of the President.30 DFID even commissioned a report from a 
respected Ugandan political scientist perceived as very well-connected, 
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (the same one cited above), aimed at developing an 
appropriate strategy for winning political support,31 and sought to establish 
which individuals within the corridors of power had most influence over 
Museveni and Cabinet policy.32 
 
When the second proposed pilot finally came before the Cabinet in 2010, a 
Cabinet sub-committee was established (which, in addition to the Minister of 
Gender, Labour and Social Development comprised several senior ministers 
                                           
28 ‘Direct Income Support’ is the preferred terminology of the MGLSD when referring to cash 
transfer schemes, possibly reflecting an awareness of negative connotations attached to the 
latter. 
29 Interview, Stephen Barrett (13 January 2014). 
30
 This view is consistent with Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey’s (2013), assessment of Uganda’s 
political settlement as primarily of the ‘dominant leader form’ and much of the political 
science literature on Museveni-era Uganda. 
31 Interview, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
32 Anonymous informant. 
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responsible for areas described as ‘real’ or ‘hard’ development policy, including 
the Ministers of Finance and of Works and Transport) to evaluate the proposal. 
The SPTF and design team went to considerable lengths to address concerns 
raised by ministers on the sub-committee. Cabinet approved the ESP/SAGE 
programme in June 2010, and even agreed to the requirement of ‘counter-part 
funding’ (i.e. that a—small—portion of the funding for the programme would 
come from the Ugandan fiscus).  
 
In a fortuitous development, Syda Bbumba, who had been Minister of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development from 2006 (i.e. during the period when the first 
proposal of a pilot cash transfer had failed to win support), had been appointed 
Minister of Finance in February 2009. Her presence on the Cabinet sub-
committee and the clout inherent in her position, together with the fact that 
certain senior MFPED officials (including a Minister of State33 in the MFPED, 
Fred Omach) were seen as having become sympathetic to cash transfers, were 
cited by informants as important contributors to the proposed pilot winning 
Cabinet support and obtaining the necessary clearance from the MFPED. 
DFID’s senior social development advisor, Rachel Waterhouse, described this as 
the single most important factor for the proposal’s success.34 
 
When asked why the proposed ESP did not meet the same fate as the first 
proposed pilot, a number of factors were highlighted by informants interviewed 
for this study. These are explored in Grebe and Mubiru (2014), but included 
greater familiarity with cash transfers (which had become more prominent in 
international development circles and were being increasingly promoted by 
institutions like the World Bank), more evidence of their effectiveness from 
other countries (Latin America, particularly, but also Southern Africa), that 
greater care had been taken to address concerns pre-emptively and, crucially, the 
support of Minister Bbumba. Perhaps the most candid response came from 
Stephen Barrett, who attributed the success of the new proposed pilot to its lack 
of a ‘poverty focus’. He explained that a deliberate strategy had been adopted to 
move away from a general focus on addressing chronic poverty and 
vulnerability, to a focus on vulnerable groups, in particular the aged, a group 
traditionally considered entitled to support. The proponents of the pilot exploited 
a sense of ‘public shame over poverty among old people’: 
 
‘We moved away from the generalised poverty discussion and focused 
on a vulnerable group that we felt we could get buy-in for and justify 
                                           
33 In Uganda, where terminology often mirrors the British system, Ministers of State are 
essentially deputy or junior ministers—i.e. they form part of the political leadership of the 
Ministry, while the administrative heads of Ministries managing the civil service are known 
as Permanent Secretaries. 
34 Interview, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
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[support for]. We moved away from the general [poor] population that 
many people believed [were poor as a result of their laziness] to a 
group where no-one could really claim that they should work harder, 
which is old people. And we built up a consensus around the 
programme which links to issues of ‘the role that old people played in 
building the country’, narratives around veterans of the bush war… 
the care old people provide to orphans [etc.]… [We] built up evidence 
around the poverty and vulnerability of old people. And that chimed 
with the public, it chimed with the media … and it chimed with 
traditional values on respect and care for the elderly’ (interview, 
Stephen Barrett, 13 January 2014). 
 
While social development bureaucrats had long embraced social assistance, 
more than one informant pointed out that the ESP (coming as it did with 
substantial donor-provided resources) represented a huge opportunity for a 
ministry that had traditionally not been very influential. As is the case in many 
developing countries, it had historically been overshadowed by ‘strategically 
important’ ministries, like defence, and the higher-spending social ministries of 
health and education. The opportunity to oversee a major development project 
with a significant budget, and to build substantial capacity within the 
department, represented a real chance for an increase in the stature and influence 
of the Ministry. This may partly explain the enthusiasm with which social 
development bureaucrats embraced their newly-central role as champions of 
cash transfers and welcomed their increased capacity to pursue a social 
protection agenda. This is therefore a case of both ideological and pragmatic 
bureaucratic ‘buy-in’ to an initially donor-driven agenda. 
 
The MGLSD bureaucrats’ continuing strong commitment to social protection 
can be seen in the product of a parallel process, the drafting of a second iteration 
of the Social Development Sector Strategic Investment Plan (SDIP 2), which 
attempted to articulate how the 2010 National Development Plan’s social 
protection commitments could be translated into budgetary appropriations. A 
stated priority of the plan was ‘extending social protection services to vulnerable 
persons (older persons, children, youth and [people with disabilities])’ 
(MGLSD, 2011: ix). In contrast to the first SDIP and earlier policy documents, 
cash transfers (‘direct income support’ in Ugandan parlance) was explicitly 
listed as a core component of the broader social protection strategy, eschewing 
the vague language of ‘social safety nets’. 
 
It appears that a politically astute design, a successful campaign of lobbying by 
donor-supported bureaucrats (which was continuing vigorously at the time of 
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this research),35 deliberate inclusiveness in the management of the programme 
(Finance Ministry officials and other senior technocrats serve on the sub-
committee responsible for implementation) and extensive efforts to generate and 
document evidence of the impacts of the cash transfer pilot36 helped build 
momentum and support for cash transfers. The Ugandan government’s 
commitment to financially contributing to the pilot, and its central role in the 
programme’s administration were symbolically important and allowed donors to 
claim success in achieving ‘government ownership’. 
 
 
4. Bureaucrats as advocates: institution-
building, capacity-building and promotion of 
cash transfers through the ESP and SAGE 
(2010-2013) 
 
Between 2006 and 2010, bureaucrats became central, essential, and arguably 
even the primary actors in the political promotion of cash transfers in Uganda. 
This centrality became even more pronounced after 2010. The ESP was called a 
‘strategy to change attitudes towards social protection’ by one informant.37 
Resistance to social assistance nevertheless continued to be strong from certain 
quarters. 
 
After the approval of the ESP in 2010, preparations for the implementation of 
the SAGE pilot started with the creation of a new Social Protection Secretariat 
within the MGLSD. Implementation was overseen at a higher level by the Social 
Protection Sub-Committee (essentially the successor of the SPTF), which 
continued to be coordinated by the MGLSD with representation from other 
Ministries, donors as well as civil society and academia.38 The Secretariat 
operated with a high level of autonomy from the rest of the Ministry (for 
example, its budget and finances were managed separately from general 
ministerial procedures, allowing for greater flexibility in recruitment, tenders for 
external service providers, etc.).39 The Secretariat’s offices were separate from 
the MGLSD’s main offices in Kampala, and it was unusually well-resourced and 
well-capacitated, in no small part thanks to substantial technical assistance 
provided by DFID-appointed contractors, including key personnel responsible 
                                           
35 Interviews, David Tumwesigye (13 January 2014); Stephen Kasaija (17 January 2014). 
36 Interviews, David Tumwesigye (13 January 2014); Beatrice Okillan (13 January 2014) 
37 Interview, David Tumwesigye (13 January 2014). 
38 It was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the MGLSD. 
39 Interview, Pius Okello (5 February 2014). 
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for a range of functions.40 Examples include Stephen Barrett (Team Leader: 
Technical Assistance), who in practice had overall operational responsibility, 
and Georgia Rowe, who served as Social Protection Policy Advisor from 2010-
2013, and who managed policy and advocacy activities—both of whom were 
formally employed by Maxwell Stamp Plc. in terms of the latter’s contract with 
DFID. These external consultants were firmly embedded in the Secretariat and 
in practice operated as if they were regular MGLSD employees and as part of an 
integrated Government of Uganda social protection team reporting to the head 
of the Secretariat, who in turn reported to the senior management of the MGLSD 
and whose work was overseen by the Social Protection Sub-Committee. 
 
The majority of the Secretariat’s staff were Ugandan, recruited from within the 
MGLSD, including many experienced social development officials (for 
example, Beatrice Okillan, a senior figure in the Secretariat). The donors’ 
strategy was to provide direct technical support, but also to facilitate skills 
transfer, develop a cadre of experienced officials, fund training activities in 
order to build the requisite capacity not only in policy-making (it set out to 
facilitate a policy development exercise the content of which it sought to 
influence), but also to continue with implementation of the pilot and, it was 
hoped, eventually a range of domestically-funded social assistance schemes.41 
Donors largely retreated into the background once the implementation of ESP 
and SAGE started, with social development bureaucrats becoming the frontline 
implementers of and advocates for social protection and cash transfers. 
Somewhat unusually, DFID and IrishAid branding was seldom prominently 
displayed on ESP/SAGE promotional materials aimed at domestic consumption, 
while in contrast Government of Uganda, MGLSD and ESP branding was very 
prominent.42  
 
Successful implementation of the SAGE pilot and in the process generating 
evidence that a government-administered cash transfer programme could 
succeed and produce the intended impacts was a significant component of this 
strategy. It was also expected to ‘generate demand’ among the population. 
Stephen Kasaija, head of the Social Protection Secretariat said: 
 
                                           
40 It was not unusual for donor-funded but government-implemented programmes in Uganda 
to have core technical staff supplied by donors or contractors of donors. 
41 Interviews, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014) and Caroline Kego Laker (28 January 
2014). 
42 This is the personal observation of the author and that it is a deliberate strategy has not been 
confirmed by informants, although Stephen Barrett stated that there is a deliberate strategy to 
allow the Ugandan government and politicians to ‘claim ownership of’ and ‘take credit for’ 
the programme. Donor branding did feature prominently on reports, the website and similar 
materials aimed at least partially at a non-domestic audience. 
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‘Originally people43 didn’t understand [social protection] and believed 
government couldn’t [implement cash transfers], but when they go to 
the ground and really see how people’s lives are changed [it influences 
their attitudes]. And the public has been very responsive—not only 
beneficiaries. … We have been receiving many calls from local 
leaders saying we need this programme in our districts’ (interview, 
Stephen Kasaija, 17 January 2014). 
 
With the creation of the Secretariat, bureaucrats took formal responsibility for 
the promotion of cash transfers to politicians, technocrats and the general public 
as part of the programme. David Tumwesigye (Advocacy Advisor in the 
Secretariat) explained: 
 
‘The ESP programme is essentially a strategy that seeks to cause 
positive change in the attitudes of people to social protection in 
Uganda, particularly political leaders and senior technocrats who 
make key policy decisions. We use the evidence from [our] studies … 
and the SAGE pilot … to convince political leaders at the highest 
level and technocrats that social protection is a worthy investment … 
so that those excluded from Uganda’s impressive economic 
performance can benefit from and contribute to Uganda’s socio-
economic transformation’ (interview, David Tumwesigye, 13 January 
2014). 
 
As previously mentioned, a primary goal of the ESP was ‘embed[ding] a 
national social protection system that benefits the poorest as a core element of 
Uganda’s national policy, planning and budgeting processes’ (ESP, undated) 
and an important component was the drafting of a Social Protection Policy 
Framework for Uganda through a process of wide consultation. DFID also 
funded a Parliamentary Forum on Social Protection, a vehicle for supportive 
Members of Parliament to promote social protection, and specifically to 
mobilise support in the legislature for the SAGE pilot and a national social 
pension.44 
 
DFID (2013: 2) identified three intended outputs beyond the pilot itself: (1) 
institutional capacity for social protection policy-making and implementing 
social transfers; (2) a national social protection policy; and (3) increased 
understanding of and commitment to public investment in social protection. This 
third output was primarily pursued through the work of the bureaucrats whom it 
                                           
43 He appeared to be referring to members of the political and policy elite here, including 
technocrats and politicians. 
44 Interview, Flavia Kabahenda, MP (4 February 2014). 
25 
 
funded and provided with technical assistance, but who further appeared in 
interviews to be autonomously (and strongly) committed to the social protection 
agenda. 
 
This raises the question, were the bureaucrats who advocated cash transfers 
mere agents of donors, or was this rather a case of alignment of purpose 
between donors and a section of the Ugandan bureaucracy? The evidence 
presented in this paper largely supports the latter conclusion. While the process 
might appear to have been donor-driven, initially probably was, and donors have 
certainly been key drivers, the level of participation and ‘buy-in’ from social 
development bureaucrats, certain other sections of the bureaucracy, civil society 
organisations and members of parliament was strikingly high. Most informants 
denied that the process continued to be dominated by donors.45 
 
Implementation of the SAGE cash transfer pilot started in 2010, with the first 
payments made to beneficiaries in October 2011. The scheme was intended to 
reach 95,000 households over five years and by the end of 2013 had enrolled 
approximately 113,000 beneficiaries and paid out UGX 32bn (about US$ 13m) 
in the fourteen original pilot districts (Okillan, 2014). Similar to the previously-
proposed pilot, districts were selected on the basis of the share of households 
considered poor and vulnerable. The selected districts cover a wide geographic 
area, although the less stable and very poor North was largely excluded, possibly 
because a range of existing reconstruction, peace-building and livelihoods 
schemes were in place in that region, including the World Bank-funded 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) and EU-funded Northern 
Uganda Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Programme referred to earlier.46 One 
opposition legislator who represented a constituency falling within one of the 
pilot districts (Apach) attributed her district’s inclusion to the involvement of 
donors in the design of the pilot, asserting that Apach, as an opposition 
stronghold,47 “would never otherwise have been selected for inclusion in a 
government programme”.48 This confirmed that perceptions of patronage in 
                                           
45 Interviews, David Tumwesigye (13 January 2014); Stephen Kasaija (17 January 2014); 
anonymous senior MGLSD official (23 January 2014); Alfred Nuamanya Buhitsya (30 
January 2014); Sarah Nahalamba (30 January 2014); Flavia Kabahenda, MP (4 February 
2014). 
46 Little data on the efforts in Northern Uganda were collected during the fieldwork for this 
paper. The relationship between reconstruction and development projects in the North and 
broader social protection policy reform (and between the different donors and government 
officials involved in the respective processes) is an area deserving of further research and 
analysis, and is also addressed to some extent in Grebe and Mubiru, 2014). 
47 Uganda’s first Prime Minister and later President, who again served as President for several 
years after the fall of the Amin regime, hailed from Apach. Since the reintroduction of 
multiparty parliamentary elections it has consistently elected opposition candidates. 
48 Interview, Lucy Ajok, MP (17 January 2014). 
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development programmes existed in some quarters. (These perceptions may 
have been strengthened by the apparently quite arbitrary ‘instruction’ from 
Museveni that a fifteenth district, Yumbe, be added to the pilot in 2013, 
although social development bureaucrats insisted on interpreting this as a 
positive indication of Presidential support for the pilot.) 
 
SAGE comprised two grants: the Senior Citizen Grant (SCG)—a universal 
(‘categorical’ or untargeted) social pension to which all persons aged 65 and 
older are entitled (60 and older in Karamoja) and a Vulnerable Families Grant 
(VFG), a poverty-targeted grant allocated to the 15% ‘most vulnerable’ 
households in each pilot district. The ‘most vulnerable’ households were 
identified using a vulnerability ranking system based on the ages, sex, disability 
status, and orphanhood status of household members. The vulnerability ranking 
methodology was designed with a view to reflecting labour capacity and 
dependency ratios, in what could be considered (in principle, rather technical 
terms) a variant of ‘proxy means testing’. Amounts paid to beneficiaries were 
modest, even by Ugandan standards, with the SCG consisting (in early 2014 and 
according to the most recent available information at the time of writing) of a 
monthly payment of UGX 25,000 (equivalent to about US$ 10) paid to each 
eligible elderly person. Grants were paid out in the form of mobile phone-based 
‘mobile money’ through a private sector service provider (MTN, a South Africa-
based multinational telecommunications company and operator of the largest 
mobile phone network in Uganda). Enrolment was largely the responsibility of 
the private sector contractor (supervised by Social Protection Secretariat-
appointed officials), with limited documentary requirements, no biometric 
component (largely in order to save costs and to keep enrolment as simple as 
possible),49 and community-based verification of age-eligibility when potential 
beneficiaries lacked birth certificates or other documentation. The ‘mobile 
money’ delivery mechanism was perceived as having worked very well and 
efficiently, despite some initial problems with enrolments and the occasional 
need to revert to manual payment processing when network infrastructure 
failed.50 
 
The pilot was funded by DFID and IrishAid to the tune of £50.5m and £7m 
respectively over the period 2010-2015 with some UNICEF technical support 
and subject to a requirement for Ugandan ‘counter-part funding’. While initially 
failing to meet commitments, the Government of Uganda later committed 
UGX 2bn (US$ 800k). This appropriation was counted as a major victory by 
both social protection officials in the MGLSD and donors. While budget 
appropriations were constitutionally a parliamentary competency, the budget 
                                           
49 Interview, Stephen Barrett (6 February 2014). 
50 Interview, Pius Okello (5 February 2014). 
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process in Uganda was dominated by the executive. A member of parliament 
who had served on the Budget Committee (Rosemary Nyakikongoro, MP) 
confirmed that it was extremely difficult for legislators to alter budget proposals 
once they had been submitted to Parliament for consideration and voting. She 
argued that lobbying earlier in the planning cycle was the only realistic way for 
legislators to substantially influence appropriations.51 
 
Despite the extensive agenda-setting efforts and vigorous promotion of social 
protection and cash transfers already described, the approval and largely on-
schedule implementation of SAGE represented a considerable achievement in 
overcoming widespread scepticism and opposition. Uganda was slower than 
many similar low-income countries (notably its neighbour Kenya) to embrace 
cash transfers. Informants among government, donor and civil society 
proponents of cash transfers almost unanimously asserted that there had been a 
sea change in attitudes, with rapidly growing acceptance of cash transfers 
(particularly a social pension). DFID’s assessment of progress in the ESP/SAGE 
programme judged that on the objective of generating increased commitment to 
social transfers, ‘outputs substantially exceeded expectations’ (DFID, 2013: 10). 
Stephen Kasaija said that: 
 
‘Prior to [the ESP] [political leaders and technocrats] did not know 
about social protection. The entire objective of this programme is to 
make social protection part and parcel of [general Government] plans, 
programmes and policies. The pilots we are doing are for generating 
evidence, so that you have something that is evidence-based as the 
basis of our [advocacy activities]. It has been very practical advocacy 
and we have been changing minds’ (interview, Stephen Kasaija, 17 
January 2014).  
 
Promotion and lobbying efforts by both donors and the Social Protection 
Secretariat were clearly in evidence during fieldwork, and included a range of 
efforts. Among these were support for civil society advocacy by funding events 
and activities, including direct DFID funding for the Uganda Platform on Social 
Protection and the funding of consultative workshops by the Secretariat from the 
ESP budget.52 (A senior DFID official, however, judged civil society efforts in 
general quite weak.53) Further, the Secretariat employed a dedicated Advocacy 
Advisor (quoted earlier), who reported pursuing as frequent as possible 
engagements with senior technocrats, members of the Executive and legislators. 
The Secretariat had supported the establishment of a Parliamentary Forum on 
                                           
51 Interview, Rosemary Nyakikongoro, MP (29 January 2014). 
52 Interviews, Alfred Nuamanya Buhitsya (30 January 2014); David Tumwesigye (13 January 
2014). 
53 Interview, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
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Social Protection,54 formally launched in February 2014 with substantial interest 
from MPs and even the news media.55 
 
Flavia Kabahenda, MP (chairperson of the Parliamentary Forum) said in 
response to question about support for cash transfers among technocrats, 
politicians and MPs: 
 
‘I’m cognisant of the fact that social protection is a new concept in the 
development agenda. … But I’m glad that when it was introduced by 
development partners, Uganda accepted to pilot it and study whether 
the government can go in for it.  
… 
As the Forum on Social Protection, we have tried to look for all the 
government assurances on social protection, starting with the 
Constitution of course. Clause 16 of our Constitution specifies that the 
government commits itself to supporting and protecting the welfare of 
vulnerable persons. … [The government has given many assurances] 
and it has signed protocols, including the Livingstone Call for Action. 
So we bank on that to say that this is not a privilege, it’s a right. It’s a 
right to which government has committed and we are demanding the 
implementation of that right’ (interview, Flavia Kabahenda, 4 
February 2014).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Secretariat had even made extensive efforts to 
influence the President himself, but had by early 2014 not succeeded in securing 
a direct audience with Museveni. As part of ESP activities, Ministers and MPs 
were even taken on several ‘study tours’ to countries with extensive cash 
transfer programmes, including South Africa, Lesotho, Brazil and Mauritius.56 
These study tours were seen by social development bureaucrats as an important 
component of their efforts to influence political and opinion leaders. 
 
                                           
54 Interviews, David Tumwesigye (13 January 2014); Flavia Kabahenda (4 February 2014). 
55 The author had the privilege of attending the launch and was struck by the enthusiasm 
expressed by a number of MPs for both the SAGE pilot and the national roll-out of a social 
pension. Senior social development bureaucrats, like Beatrice Okillan and Pius Okello, 
outlined both evidence of the pilot’s success and the Secretariat’s proposed rollout plan for a 
domestically-funded national social pension. No donors were present at the launch, and social 
development bureaucrats were clearly trying both to strengthen the coalition in support of 
cash transfers that they had been working to construct (and which included prominent MPs) 
and to pre-empt potential opposition by presenting strong evidence of the efficacy, 
affordability and feasibility of cash transfers. 
56 Delegations including Ministers, technocrats and Members of Parliament visited Lesotho 
and South Africa in November 2011, Brazil in March 2012 and Mauritius during February 
2014. 
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After 2010, social development bureaucrats were clearly the primary advocates 
of expanded social protection, and the donors’ role had become one primarily of 
supporting these bureaucrats. With respect to agenda-setting and political 
support-building, it seems reasonable to refer to the period from the start of 
SAGE’s implementation as the era of bureaucratic advocacy on cash transfers. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Explaining growing acceptance of cash transfers in Uganda is difficult, and this 
paper does not fully do so. The broader issues and other factors—including that 
prevailing political discourse have changed over the period—are treated in 
greater detail in Grebe and Mubiru (2014). This paper contributes to the existing 
literature on welfare policy reform in Uganda—which recognises the critical 
importance of domestic politics—by highlighting the process by which donors 
and, more specifically, social development bureaucrats helped shape the 
domestic political agenda over the period 2002-2013. 
 
The paper has presented evidence that social development bureaucrats 
enthusiastically embraced an originally primarily donor-driven agenda of 
promoting cash transfers. It also showed how donors had to modify both their 
policy preferences and strategy for promoting policy reform in response to 
domestic political realities and increasingly retreated into the background as 
bureaucrats became the front-line advocates.  
 
Before donors threw their considerable financial weight and influence behind 
them, social development bureaucrats had little influence over the rest of the 
bureaucracy (especially financial technocrats) or the broader political agenda. 
But with donor support, these bureaucrats managed to embed social protection 
and social assistance in general, cash transfers in particular (and especially 
social pensions) firmly in the domestic political agenda. Donor investment in 
these bureaucrats’ capacity reflected a realisation that their own efforts at 
securing domestic political support had largely failed. With support from civil 
society and a section of the political elite (particularly MPs who see electoral 
advantages), these bureaucrats had secured a pilot cash transfer and significantly 
contributed to the emergence of a strong coalition in support of a national social 
pension. Their role was not only important but essential to the approval and 
success of the SAGE pilot. Herein lies the paper’s central contribution: previous 
studies have not given sufficient recognition of the donor-bureaucrat alliance at 
the heart of promoting welfare policy reform in Uganda. 
 
Explaining why historically weak social development bureaucrats (and given 
that the literature suggests bureaucrats in general were subject to executive 
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domination) had sufficient influence and power to, with the assistance of donors 
and to some extent civil society, alter the Ugandan development policy agenda 
requires careful consideration of the specific political conditions within which it 
occurred. Insufficient data is available to render final judgement on this, but the 
evidence presented here suggests that the following factors may help explain the 
paradox: (1) ideas matter, and convincing political leaders and some financial 
technocrats made a real difference; (2) closely related to the first point—explicit 
and deliberate advocacy efforts—which were aimed broadly, met with success 
in part because of sheer persistence and in part because certain kinds of 
(carefully chosen) arguments resonated sufficiently within policy and political 
elites (such as presentation of cash transfers as ‘developmental’); (3) 
consultative policy-making processes allowed bureaucrats, donors and civil 
society to ensure social protection ‘language’ entered formal planning and 
policy documents in ways that helped generate and sustain the momentum of 
agenda-setting and advocacy; and (4) perceived electoral advantages and the 
dynamics of ‘competitive clientelism’ (Golooba and Hickey, 2013) may have 
created incentives on politicians in the Executive and Legislature to support cash 
transfers. It may also be that weak opposition parties, a weak legislature and 
executive dominance actually free bureaucrats from effective political oversight, 
adding to their power to influence the policy agenda. These and other factors are 
addressed more fully in Grebe and Mubiru (2014). 
 
Despite this substantial progress in winning support for, building capacity to 
implement, and planning for a national social pension, the future of cash 
transfers in Uganda remained uncertain by early 2014. In spite of encouraging 
signs, the limits to donor and bureaucratic power in Uganda were also clear from 
the research. Presidential support remained open to doubt, questions over the 
scalability of the existing implementation model had not been settled and 
resistance from fiscally conservative technocrats and some politicians to 
financing a national programme may well still have been insurmountable. The 
tremendous optimism among many social development bureaucrats, donor 
officials and members of parliament therefore seemed premature.  
 
 
6. Postscript: A turning point in political 
support for a national social pension? 
 
By the end of 2013, a national social pension was firmly on the national 
agenda,57 the major parties had endorsed it (already for the 2011 election), it was 
                                           
57 It would probably be inaccurate to say that cash transfers in general had become widely 
accepted—it was specifically a social pension that was gaining acceptance and only the SCG 
that was being considered for national rollout. The VFG was strikingly absent from 
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being debated in Parliament, in publicly in newspapers, and the informants 
interviewed for this research were almost unanimous in their optimism that a 
national social pension would be implemented. This was evident at the public 
launch of the Parliamentary Platform on Social Protection in February 2014. 
 
Substantial capacity had been created within the MGLSD to implement cash 
transfers. Systems had been put in place that allowed the national-level Social 
Protection Secretariat to deploy staff and systems to the regional and local levels 
for day-to-day implementation. Significant investments were made by the 
payments service provider and most teething problems had been ironed out.58 
But it remained to be seen how robust this capacity would prove once the 
technical assistance delivered as part of the donor support came to an end (or 
declined in significance) if the programme were scaled up significantly. 
Furthermore, the scalability of systems and practices were in question: in order 
to support implementation of the pilot, substantial resources had been deployed 
from the centre, and districts and counties had received considerable assistance 
(for example, with filling relevant local vacancies and training of local-level 
officials). Recruiting sufficient and appropriately qualified staff had been 
identified as a challenge in the pilot, raising the question as to whether this 
practice could be sustained at national scale. 
 
The research reported here reveals that cash transfers were by early 2014 
increasingly being presented by proponents as not merely a poverty alleviation 
mechanism but as a way to stimulate local economic development, aggregate 
demand (i.e. positively impact the macroeconomy) and entrepreneurial 
activity.59 There appeared to be a growing acceptance that certain sections of the 
population were unlikely to benefit much (at least in the short to medium term) 
from economic development. The phrase ‘inclusive development’ was in wide 
use, with cash transfers seen as one way to ensure that the most marginalised 
(including, and most especially the aged) were not left entirely out of the 
                                                                                                                                    
discussions of the SAGE pilot, even by the officials responsible for its implementation. The 
three most probable reasons for this (based on a broad view of informant responses) were (1) 
the difficulties associated with its implementation, most notably the onerous data collection 
requirements of its vulnerability targeting; (2) the controversy it sometimes gave rise to at 
community level (several informants, including Pius Okello, interview, 5 February 2014; and 
Beatrice Okillan, interview, 13 January 2014, indicated that its complex vulnerability ranking 
methodology was poorly understood by beneficiary communities, resulting in disputes over 
eligibility and allegations of favouritism); and (3) the greater political acceptability of direct 
income support to older persons than poverty-targeted cash transfers. 
58 Interview, Pius Okello (5 February 2014). 
59 This argument is increasingly common among proponents of cash transfers globally. See, 
for example, Hanlon et al. (2010) and Barrientos (2013). It was also prominent in Beatrice 
Okillan’s presentation to Members of Parliament during the launch of the Parliamentary 
Forum (Okillan, 2014) 
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development process.60 These may have reflected both an increasingly receptive 
political environment and carefully-tailored messages designed to resonate with 
specific audiences. 
 
Furthermore, public demand and the perceived electoral advantages of 
supporting the pilot and its expansion were widely cited by respondents as a 
reason for optimism. The SAGE pilot was widely seen as an extremely popular 
programme that had greatly enhanced the visibility of the government in the 
remote and rural communities where many beneficiaries lived. Many informants 
attributed the growing political support for the pilot—especially in Parliament—
to politicians noticing its popularity and potential as a vote-winner. Some MPs 
argued that it would be ‘political suicide’ to oppose the programme. In fact, both 
the NRM and the Forum for Democratic Change (the official opposition) 
included a commitment to social pensions in their election manifestos for the 
2011 election, with the latter even including the specific commitment of 
doubling the size of the monthly payment.61 
 
In August 2013, the President wrote to the Minister of Gender, Labour and 
Social Development, instructing her to develop a national rollout plan in 
collaboration with the Finance Ministry and to publish it publicly. This directive 
from the President was interpreted by social development bureaucrats as a 
strong indication of presidential support (which in turn was considered a 
prerequisite for national rollout), and had greatly encouraged ESP officials who 
felt unsure of the success of their efforts at lobbying Museveni. Also interpreted 
as an encouraging sign was the direct presidential instruction to add a fifteenth 
district to the pilot, referred to earlier. This instruction reportedly followed a 
request from senior NRM figures in the Yumbe district, which necessarily also 
raises questions about the use of the pilot as a means of deploying patronage, 
and in particular what role patronage may play in a national rollout with more 
limited donor involvement.  
 
A large majority of informants were very confident that the national rollout of a 
social pension would go ahead. As Barrett pointed out, ‘the Government has 
committed funds now—when they did this, they knew there was no turning 
back.’62 Flavia Kabahenda, MP (chairperson of the Parliamentary Forum) was 
optimistic: 
 
                                           
60 Interview, Nahalamba Sarah Birungi (20 January 2014). 
61 The NRM’s election manifesto states that “The NRM Government will roll out the cash 
transfer program for older persons” (NRM, 2010:41) and the FDC’s that it “will pay 
UGX 50,000 per month to persons over 65 years” (FDC, 2010: 20). 
62 Interview, Stephen Barrett (6 February 2014). 
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‘The government has appreciated that the impact of the pilot is very 
positive. They really appreciate the fact that it has improved the 
livelihoods of [beneficiaries], improved the quality and quantity of 
meals [consumed], the health and even supporting orphaned children 
to attend schools. And that gives me optimism that when we talk 
about rollout, I think government will buy it very very well’ 
(interview, Flavia Kabahenda, 4 February 2014). 
 
A number of uncertainties nevertheless remained. While a national rollout plan 
had been drafted by early 2014, which officials were confident was affordable,63 
a decision was not expected be made quickly. Politicians may find it hard to 
agree on a phased rollout plan.64 While the selection of fourteen (now fifteen) 
districts could be accepted while the programme was in pilot phase and largely 
funded by donors, disagreements over the details of any plan to slowly add 
districts to the programme were expected. For this reason the MGLSD’s rollout 
plan proposed a relatively quick four-year phase-in and presented both “full 
district” and “partial district” options—in the latter, a selection of sub-counties 
within all districts would be included from the first year (Okillan, 2014)—
probably with a view to securing wide parliamentary support, since all MPs’ 
constituencies would start benefitting early. Stephen Barrett expressed the fear 
that approval would be stalled by these potential disagreements or that a too-
quick rollout (that overwhelms the capacity of implementing institutions) would 
be agreed. 
 
Several respondents expected that any announcement would be made at the most 
politically opportune time with a view to the 2016 election. Only time will tell 
whether 2013/2014 will in fact turn out to be the turning point in support for a 
national social pension that it appeared to be at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
63 The Social Protection Secretariat had by mid-2013 started the process of exploring 
financing options and costing the scale-up of the cash transfer pilot through an exercise 
known as the Uganda Social Protection Financing Options Study (see Cammack and 
Twinamatsiko, 2013). The Secretariat estimated the costs of scaling up the Senior Citizens 
Grant nationally over a five year period and claimed that the scale-up could be financed 
entirely out of a ‘small portion of projected revenue growth’ (Okillan, 2014). 
64 Interview, Stephen Barrett (6 February 2014).  
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